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In an era in which information has emerged asan increasingly important dimension of nationalpower, U.S. export control policy toward trade
in supercomputers1  has recently turned away from tradi-
tional (i.e., Cold War-era)
restrictive strategies, fa-
voring instead an approach
that will foster the wide
diffusion of this technol-
ogy.  In the economic
realm, the shift toward
openness will have salu-
tary effects upon the
supercomputer industry,
helping U.S. companies to
maintain and extend their
dominance of the market,
and to rack up handsome
profits.2   However, in the
security sphere, concerns
will necessarily arise regarding the possibility that other
nations, or even some non-state actors, might use the
vast power of these computational engines to enable them
to develop and secretly test a wide range of weapons.
While the use of supercomputers in support of nuclear
proliferation activities remains a paramount concern, the
ability to design and produce very advanced conventional
weapons—and to engage in some forms of “information
warfare”—also flows from the acquisition of high perfor-
mance computing (HPC) capabilities.  Thus, in the area
of supercomputers, proliferation concerns are growing
in diversity and complexity.
Despite the fact that the new “open” policy has already
received presidential approval (on October 6, 1995), af-
ter only a very limited public (or private) debate, the
built-in requirements for annual review allow consider-
able room for continuing reappraisal.  Also, the 1984
bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan
to coordinate policies on the sale of technological sys-
tems with military applications requires Japanese assent
to the new HPC policy.  In this case, the Japanese gov-
ernment did not provide input prior to the October an-
nouncement and still has not granted its approval.
Finally, in addition to these other reasons for review of
the presidential decision, the very seriousness of the
issue, which highlights a growing tension between com-
mercial and security interests, should encourage a care-
ful examination of the merits of the various strategies
that might govern this particular export control policy.
With these considerations in mind, this essay first
discusses the details of the new export control policy
toward supercomputers.  Then it considers the range of
plausible strategies that might apply in this issue area,
on a spectrum that has
complete openness at
one end and exclusion
at the other, with hybrid
approaches in  between.
A few historical analo-
gies illustrate the time-
lessness of the problem
of controlling informa-
tion flows and help in
developing an analytic
framework.  Evaluation
of the relative merits of
the differing export con-
trol strategies follows.
This essay concludes by
drawing some implications for further clarifying and
amending the existing policy. It suggests that this issue’s
importance to U.S. national security may require the
inclusion of legislative branch input on a continuing
basis, and perhaps some decisionmaking authority, rather
than continuing to keep these export controls solely
under the authority of the executive branch of govern-
ment.
THE POLICY
If one could describe the range of possible export
control strategies as a spectrum of choices, ranging from
a preclusive, closed stance at one end, to complete open-
ness at the other, the Clinton policy falls squarely in the
middle.  On the more proprietary side, the policy pro-
hibits sales of any supercomputers to countries that pose
national security concerns to the United States.  These
include such “usual suspects” as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea.  Cuba, already excluded from such pur-
chases by virtue of the overall U.S. economic embargo,
fills out the membership roster of this “pariahs club.”
At the other end of the spectrum, Western Europe, Ja-
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pan, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand have
no limits whatsoever (in terms of U.S. governmental
review) on their purchases.
Between the extremes lie two middle layers.  The
more open one allows sales of machines capable of 10
billion theoretical operations per second (TOPS), with
only record-keeping requirements, to all South Ameri-
can countries, most of the former Soviet satellites, South
Korea, and South Africa.  Individual licensees must
support their purchases above this level.  Above 20 bil-
lion TOPS, members of this group would possibly have
to allow end-user site safeguards.
The last class of purchasers includes former Cold
War adversaries Russia, China, Vietnam, and Syria;
states of the Middle East, the Maghreb, and South Asia
also fall in this more preclusive range of the spectrum.
All may purchase computational engines without any
regulation up to two billion TOPS, a figure that clearly
crosses the threshold of high performance (set since
1993 at 1.5 billion TOPS).  Purchases between two to
10 billion TOPS require the granting of individual li-
censes, with record keeping by the exporter or, in cases
between seven to 10 billion, as required by the U.S.
government.  Above 10 billion TOPS, the policy states
only that “additional safeguards may be required at the
end-user location.”3   Typically, precautions against di-
version to military uses extend to having U.S. techni-
cians in the employ of the manufacturer operate the
supercomputer in a segregated facility.  Such a site must
prove sufficiently secure to prevent access or control by
the purchaser, who enjoys only the outputs of the com-
putational engine.  However, the new HPC export con-
trol policy articulates no  mandatory requirement to take
such precautionary measures, even concerning sales of
the most advanced machines.
This hybrid strategy toward the diffusion of informa-
tion has clear antecedents in the ancient and medieval
eras, as well as in more recent times. For example,
Hippocrates took the view that medical science should
spread, but very carefully.  Thus, the Hippocratic Oath
requires, among other things, keeping knowledge of the
healing arts away from “strangers.”  Medieval guilds
followed a similar strategy; but this approach no doubt
reached its zenith in the alliance between commerce
and state during Venice’s golden age in the 14th and
15th centuries.  The various guilds and the Venetian
government decided, in the interest of commercial com-
petitiveness, overseas production, and profit maximiza-
tion, to allow skilled artisans to emigrate. However,
Venetian secret police would monitor their activities,
and those who breached agreements to keep the inner
workings of their crafts safe from foreigners found them-
selves kidnapped back to Venice.4
In the 20th century, two well-known examples of the
hybrid approach include efforts to control the spread of
nuclear and missile technologies.  The first has attempted
to allow the spread of peaceful nuclear power as an
energy source while precluding its use for the creation
of weapons of mass destruction.  In the second case,
the principally military uses of missiles have led to a
somewhat more proprietary Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime (MTCR), although “friendly” states clearly
have substantial access to this technology. The new HPC
export control strategy flows from these two cases, draw-
ing upon both the need to allow peaceful uses while
discouraging military applications, and fostering the
creation of classes of “tame” and “rogue” states to help
in identifying the appropriate customer base.
The foregoing examples of hybrid export control strat-
egies all have varying degrees of commercial ramifica-
tions, with the Venetian case representing the most sub-
stantially market-driven calculus of strategic decision.
The HPC situation has a similarly robust economic di-
mension. The possibility thus arises that the current
hybrid export control strategy might have emerged from
the effort to balance American commercial and security
interests, with political leaders shaping policy in re-
sponse to pressure exerted by domestic interest groups,
both corporate and individual.
With regard to President Clinton, for example, one
might hypothesize that his loosening of HPC export
controls reflected a response to direct or indirect pres-
sures.  Campaign finance records, however, indicate that
the computer industry’s contributions to him in 1992
fell near the bottom of the list of financial support shown
on an  industrial sector-by-sector basis.  Further, scant
evidence appears to suggest that indirect pressure might
come from a Congress influenced by the computer in-
dustry.  In the last Congressional election cycle (1994),
for example, total contributions from computer compa-
nies and trade associations amounted to only $720,000,
whereas the agriculture industry contributed $15.5 mil-
lion.5   Thus, the possibility that high-tech interest groups
have “captured” either the president or Congress on the
HPC issue seems extremely unlikely.  This conclusion
does not, however, rule out the possibility that the presi-
dent might take actions in favor of computer industry
interests, in the hope of gaining their support in the
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1996 election, especially since Silicon Valley lies in
electoral-vote-rich California.
An understanding of the origins, nature, and scope of
the current HPC export control policy, though useful,
does not by itself allow for thoughtful evaluation of the
path chosen.  For this purpose, the key alternative strat-
egies must come under some scrutiny as well.  Only
then might a better sense of the most appropriate policy
emerge, or of the conditions under which a shift in
strategy might grow necessary.  Further, one must also
consider the prospects for control and the related goals.
Fortunately, the rapidly advancing frontier of HPC
“TOPS capability” guarantees future opportunities for
control, both in terms of the rate of advance and regard-
ing specific states.
ALTERNATE STRATEGIES
With regard to the spectrum of HPC policies that lie
on either side of the hybrid approach, the major alter-
natives consist of the adoption of either preclusive or
inclusive strategies.  Attempting to prevent the spread
of advanced technology or knowledge has long proven a
very attractive option.  In the military realm, the Byz-
antine Empire strove for centuries to keep the secret of
its incendiary naval weapon, “Greek fire.”  During this
same period, Christendom in general sought to keep
military technology regarding heavy artillery out of
Muslim hands.  In the 19th century, the British Royal
Navy attempted to keep its technological innovations
secret until it grew clear that competitors would soon
begin production of the device in question.6   Finally, in
the 20th century, a veil of secrecy, of the most preclu-
sive sort,  has remained over stealth technology,
While the tendency toward proprietary strategies in
the military realm has remained fairly constant, with
some notable exceptions mentioned below, civilian tech-
nologies and intellectual properties have seemed to move
more toward openness since the dawn of the industrial
age.  Thus, in the preindustrial 15th century, Prince
Henry of Portugal maintained tight control over naviga-
tion science (a truly dual-use discipline), and the Ro-
man Catholic Church sought to prevent the publication
of the Bible into the various vernaculars.  With the com-
ing of mass production and mass global markets in the
18th century, however, the commercial value of exclu-
sion seems to have dropped.  Technologies  became
more interconnected, and industrial advances worldwide
meant not only more competition, but more markets for
sophisticated manufactured goods, and enormous de-
mand for manufacturing equipment.  Clearly, the 19th
century Manchester creed, which holds that there ex-
ists a system-wide harmony of economic interests, sig-
naled the onset of a serious tension between the benefits
of technological diffusion for trade and its risks in the
security sphere.
If commercial concerns form the paramount interests
of a state, it would seem appropriate to pursue a strat-
egy of openness toward technological innovations.  As
mentioned above, this approach has proven common in
the more than two centuries since the beginning of the
industrial revolution, even in the area of military tech-
nology. An excellent example of laissez-faire attitudes
toward even the most cutting-edge technologies arises
in the case of the submarine.  Robert Fulton, the Ameri-
can inventor, spent much of his time during the
Napoleonic Wars trying to market his submarine (which
actually worked and even sank an enemy ship in a “com-
bat experiment”) to both the British and the French.
The Royal Navy rejected him out of hand, no doubt
because of fears for the future of sailing fleets.  Napo-
leon simply could not believe that this weapon would
overturn the naval balance.7
The understandable apprehensions of both Britain and
France notwithstanding, Fulton was able to hawk his
wares wherever he wanted. This lax policy remains
puzzling and has present-day analogs.  Current diesel
submarine design has arrived at air independent pro-
pulsion and at acoustic superiority to nuclear vessels,
posing serious potential threats to the freedom of the
seas.  Nevertheless, the trade in these boats goes on in
the almost complete absence of regulation, allowing the
emergence of a new kind of regional naval arms
racing.8
EVALUATING THE STRATEGIES
Clearly, the various security and economic conse-
quences of adopting one of the above mentioned export
control strategies must figure significantly in any
comparative evaluation of alternatives.  In the military
sphere, concerns should extend to potential shifts in
relative power, the effects on weapons (nuclear and ad-
vanced conventional) proliferation and war-marking ca-
pabilities, and the prospects for arms racing.  Analysis
of commercial effects should revolve around notions of
short-term market share outcomes and longer-term con-
cerns about industry viability and competitiveness.
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Finally, some sense of the evolutionary pace of the HPC
industry and the practical prospects for controlling the
diffusion of this information technology must also form
a part of the analysis.
With these factors in mind, one may quickly note
that, to the extent allowable by the state of the technol-
ogy, a preclusive strategy maximizes security while
paying little heed to commercial effects. Conversely, an
open strategy  fosters the greatest degree of commercial
competitiveness, but may have deleterious consequences
in the security sphere. A hybrid approach, however,
offers some hope of serving both security and business
interests.  This last strategy also accommodates itself
well to an industry which, by all accounts, appears poised
for a period of explosive growth in terms of the TOPS-
capabilities of the best machines.
If one accepts the notion that each year, the level of
“uncontrollable” advance in HPC technology will rise,
as will the maximum performance of the leading com-
putational engines, then one might find it reasonable to
allow unrestricted sales, at the very least, to the “con-
trol” threshold, and perhaps a bit beyond.  While at-
tractive in theory, in that it addresses both security and
economic concerns, how does this notion relate to the
evaluation criteria?
Clearly, the hybrid approach fosters a very robust
commercial environment for the HPC industry and,
unlike the purely “open” strategy, does not contribute to
the erosion of relative power advantages.  Or does it?
The answer to this question depends both upon the set-
ting of the control threshold and the policy toward sales
to specific countries.  The government-sponsored analy-
sis of the HPC issue develops a comprehensive meth-
odology for identifying the appropriate thresholds on a
class-by-class basis, but avoids discussion of factors such
as the risks entailed in vending supercomputers to po-
tential politico-military rivals.9   In this regard, then,
one must note that the current HPC export control policy
derives principally from notions of technological deter-
minism,10  with a lesser degree of care shown to the
consequences for shifts in relative power.  Herein lie
some problems.
Concerns about the risks of a too open policy should
revolve around its effects on nonproliferation and
counterproliferation policy, both in the nuclear and ad-
vanced conventional sphere.  With this in mind, the
currently formulated HPC policy will contribute less to
adding new nuclear proliferators,11  but may allow those
with some weapons to increase production and refine
capabilities quite significantly, and to do so without
detection.  For example, Gary Milhollin, of the Wis-
consin Project on Arms Control, has observed that “Rus-
sia and China will be able to develop their nuclear arse-
nals [further] without having to conduct underground
tests and we will not be able to monitor them.”12  This
possibility could foster both qualitative and quantitative
arms racing.  As nettlesome as the prospect of the in-
creasing opacity of nuclear development seems, though,
this problem could ease if the U.S. government empha-
sized other nonproliferation policies, ranging from the
control of very advanced communications technology
to the imposition of serious penalties for detected viola-
tions of existing nonproliferation and arms control agree-
ments.
The greater proliferation risk engendered by the HPC
agreement lies in the risk that potential adversaries will
now have the ability to bring their militaries into the
information age.  High performance computing capa-
bilities will allow them to develop the complex commu-
nications battle management systems needed to fight in
the future, nonlinear battlespace.  Currently, the sen-
sors and image analysis capabilities needed to wage
“cyberwar” fall in a range from one to eight billion TOPS.
However, even in this area, one may note important
nuances.  For example, advances in the design of com-
posite and/or explosive reactive armor rely upon HPC
capabilities well above eight billion TOPS, all the way
to 21 billion.  Similarly, the requirements for the most
advanced antisubmarine sensing devices begin at the
eight billion TOPS level, and extend to the 20 billion
level.13  Much still remains at the farthest reaches of
HPC.
However, the frontiers of HPC expand further every
several months, putting even the 20 billion TOPS level
in sight by the year 2000.14  This progression implies a
need to monitor closely the threshold of “controllabil-
ity,” and to inquire as to whether the current level of
controls might provide potential rivals with easy oppor-
tunities to enhance their military capabilities greatly.
Further, even if a particular TOPS level becomes “un-
controllable,” the issue of whether to sell the technol-
ogy or assist its development requires consideration.
Why make an information proliferator’s path to the
design and production of very advanced conventional
weaponry easier?  Britain asked this question during its
mid-19th century naval rivalry with France, when ships
converted from sail to steam, concluding that control-
ling the export of steam engines raised French costs by
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over 35 percent.  France, however, viewed the develop-
ment of its own steam engine industry as a sine qua non
of great power, and took up the cudgels to compete with
Britain.15
The foregoing raises the possibilities that tighter con-
trols may help to maintain relative advantages over
potential competitors, but also that more preclusive
approaches might encourage or require development of
indigenous design and production capabilities.  With
this in mind, one may see that both major potential
rivals to the United States, Russia and China, both cur-
rently topping out at the 1.5 billion TOPS level, have
barely reached the minimum level of high performance
computing.  The 1995 HPC guideline will allow them
to advance, rapidly and cost effectively, even though
they fall into the more preclusive range of the new policy.
On the other hand, India, toward which HPC policy has
long followed a very preclusive course, has developed
capabilities of its own of around three billion TOPS.
This development confirms the point that exclusion may
breed internal efforts at information proliferation.16  Thus,
short-term efforts to protect relative power advantages
may improve others’ long-term prospects.
In summary, this discussion of the strategic and com-
mercial factors, which forms the basis for strategy evalu-
ation, describes two tensions.  First, efforts to safe-
guard national power advantages over others, associ-
ated with exclusion, engender commercial costs in terms
of lost market share.  Similarly, openness fosters eco-
nomic competitiveness, while tending to erode advan-
tages in relative power over actual and potential rival
states.  The second tension lies within the realm of se-
curity concerns, in that attempts to preserve power
advantages through exclusion may have beneficial short-
term effects, but may encourage competitors to engage
in an HPC “information arms race” that will have nega-
tive long-term effects.
Reconciling these tensions, to the extent possible, and
selecting an appropriate export control strategy demands
knowledge of two types.  First, a reasonably precise
sense of the degree of HPC technical controllability must
inform preclusive efforts.  As the United States does
not hold a monopoly over HPC technology, a completely
closed strategy will prove infeasible.  However, to the
extent to which the rate of advance follows predictable
patterns, a “moving preclusive limit” on HPC exports
could emerge.
The other quantifiable factor that should guide stra-
tegic decisionmaking lies in the area of economic im-
pact.  Currently, the entire HPC export market has an-
nual sales of roughly $35 billion,17  of which the United
States holds a roughly 80 percent share.  Presumably, a
preclusive strategy would exert downward pressure on
U.S. market share, while openness would help to main-
tain this overwhelmingly dominant position.  Also,
closed approaches would hinder general growth of the
market’s size, while openness could enlarge it consid-
erably.  However, economic considerations and fore-
casts of possible outcomes regarding market size and
share always have an element of uncertainty.  There-
fore, the negative effects of exclusion could actually prove
modest, as could the positive results from openness.
Given the somewhat uncontrollable nature of techni-
cal progress in HPC, and the uncertainties about eco-
nomic effects, a hybrid strategy seems best suited to the
needs of the situation.  Pure exclusion lies beyond the
realm of possibility, but a guarded approach, calibrated
in terms of the rate of technological advance, can work.
With regard to impacts on market size and share, one
cannot know now what will happen. One can, however,
measure results from year to year, resetting limits based
on market data, and keeping in mind the changing thresh-
old of technological controllability.  For these tasks, the
hybrid approach, which combines preclusive and open
elements, appears optimal.  The Clinton HPC strategy
clearly falls in this category, although there remains a
number of security issues.  The correct resolution of
these issues will determine the success of this HPC
export control venture. Since advances in operational
warfighting, as well as in command and control sys-
tems, depend upon HPC capabilities, they have become
an essential element of national power in the informa-
tion age.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The preceding analysis has identified the strategies
available for approaching the issue of export controls
on supercomputers, and has supported the notion that a
hybrid  policy, mixing open and closed elements, has
the best chance to foster commercial competitiveness
without unduly compromising the national security.  In
this regard, the recently elucidated Clinton plan for HPC
export controls appears sensible.  However, this policy
will have consequences in a number of areas, each of
which bears significantly upon security issues and re-
quires careful attention.
First, to deal with the likelihood of increasing
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996
John Arquilla
60
“opacity” on the part of potential rivals or non-aligned
existing nuclear states that may wish to improve their
arsenals (e.g., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and pos-
sibly North Korea), steps should commence to ensure
their compliance with existing arms control and non-
proliferation agreements and to sharpen the penalties
for noncompliance. Further, counterproliferation efforts
should focus increasingly on the monitoring of improve-
ments in sophisticated satellite and other communica-
tions and control systems.  Finally, the problem of
“downstreaming” HPC capabilities to pariahs or rogue
states requires very close after-sale relations, accompa-
nied by stiff sanctions for violations.  Indeed, HPC moni-
toring of this sort may have to become a major intelli-
gence function.
The same will certainly hold true in the area of
advanced conventional arms, where the undue spread
of HPC capabilities may undermine the American ad-
vantage in relative power that has emerged in the imme-
diate post-Cold War era. Indeed, the likely shape of
conflict in the information age suggests that HPC will
have ever increasing military applications.  This im-
plies, quite possibly, the need for bi- and multilateral
arms control agreements on advanced conventional weap-
ons.  At a minimum, though, the prospect of the spread
of HPC-driven arsenals requires careful, continuing net
assessments of others’ HPC capabilities on a very fre-
quent, at least annual, basis.
This concern should also act as a spur to pursue the
formation of an international governmental organiza-
tion for dealing with the problem of “information tech-
nology proliferation,” perhaps analogous to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  If the generally
successful multilateral efforts to stem the spread of
nuclear weapons represent a reliable indicator, then the
prospects for similar success in the HPC area appear
quite good.  However, the worldwide diffusion of HPC
knowledge and capabilities is much greater than nuclear
weapon technologies. This difference suggests that, be-
cause of ease of access to this information, the political
problems with achieving multilateral controls could prove
quite substantial, if not insurmountable.
This raises the second key policy issue: Japan’s role
in any HPC export control regime.  Without Japanese
cooperation, the preclusive elements of U.S. strategy
will grow problematic, as Japan constitutes a second
major source of supply for HPC.  In this regard, the
United States should involve Japan more deeply in the
setting of controls, as called for by the 1984 bilateral
agreement.  More to the point, though, the HPC issue
may now assume a significant place in U.S.-Japanese
relations.  For, example, one might expect Japan to seek
a lessening of pressure to open its markets to American
goods in return for full compliance with the HPC
regime.  This bargaining strategy would make calcula-
tions of U.S. economic costs more complex, as frac-
tiousness over trade could cost both HPC sales world-
wide, and hurt the marketing of other U.S. products in
Japan.  On the other hand, Japan remains heavily reli-
ant upon American markets for its goods, and U.S. forces
will likely increase in value as a counterweight to rising
Chinese power in the years ahead.  The issue has many
dimensions and should form an area of careful focus in
the formation of future U.S. foreign policy.  At a mini-
mum, though, Japanese cooperation forms a necessary
condition for the mounting of broader, multilateral ef-
forts to manage the diffusion of HPC technology.
A third issue arises if limiting the spread of very
powerful computational engines  proves problematic over
the long-term, with the threshold of controllability con-
stantly driven higher.  If this occurs, as this and other
analyses suggest it will, then perhaps a more nuanced
approach to HPC strategy can develop, one centered on
the idea of controlling the dissemination of software
rather than hardware.  Indeed, analyst suggested that
the urgent need “to safeguard critical software...may be
more important than the [HPC] computers themselves.”18
This notion suggests that the definition of “high per-
formance” has qualitative as well as quantitative aspects.
Unfortunately, the current HPC policy considers only
the latter.  This lesser attentiveness to the more qualita-
tive side of HPC has led to some near accidents, such
as the recent initiative to allow China access to advanced
U.S. military simulation software.  This policy only
collapsed after heated internal debate, some of which
became public.19   The inclusion of the qualitative
dimension of HPC makes good sense and may also lessen
the impact of the increasing inability of states to control
the diffusion of hardware technology.  Software may
even prove, as The New York Times has suggested, more
important than brute force calculating capabilities.  For,
in the words of Claude Shannon, the “founding father”
of modern information science, overemphasizing the
quantitative side of computing will lead to the creation
of machines that “see far but notice little; that remem-
ber everything, but know nothing.”
The final implication for policy raised by the forego-
ing analysis concerns executive powers.  Since the late
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1930s, when U.S. technological export controls began,
the president has controlled this issue area completely.
In the case of the current HPC policy, President Clinton
acted in this tradition, without Congressional approval.
Given the profound economic and military ramifica-
tions of this policy, however, a strong prima facie case
for involving the legislative branch emerges.  The issue
of HPC, while complex, remains quite open to under-
standing, particularly by expert congressional staff mem-
bers. Finally, the potentially serious consequences of
missteps demand a more protracted, comprehensive
debate on the issue, particularly with regard to sales to
potential adversaries, risks of “downstreaming,” and the
need to maintain U.S. advantages in power relative to
others. Therefore, hearings on the HPC issue should
begin soon to address the complex questions that we
are only beginning to understand—but ignore at our peril.
1 Since 1993, supercomputers have consisted of that class of computational
engines capable of 1.5 billion theoretical operations per second (TOPS).
For ease of reference, and to recognize the vast and rapid increase in com-
puting power, this article does not use the older term “MTOPS,” which
stands for millions of theoretical operations per second.
2 A government estimate of the immediate effects of the new policy suggests
that computer exports could grow by nearly an additional 10 percent annu-
ally.  As President Clinton noted, “[i]t is good for U.S. workers and U.S.
business.”  See the “Statement by the President,” October 6, 1995.
3 Emphasis added.  For further details about the classes of purchasers and
the various levels of monitoring, see the Presidential Press Release entitled
“Export Controls on Computers,” October 6, 1995.
4 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (New York:  Doubleday,
1950), p. 112,  notes also that the secret police did some killing to prevent
the diffusion of commercial information.
5
 Report of the Federal Election Commission (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1995); and David J. Lynch, “Industry now must plug in to
political game,” USA Today, January 16, 1996, pp. 1-2.
6
 Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton:  Princeton
University Press, 1943), see especially p. 44.
7
 W.B. Parsons, Robert Fulton and the Submarine (New York:  Dodd, Mead,
1922) provides a detailed account of Fulton’s efforts to gain acceptance of
his submarine.  See also Brodie, pp. 264-7.
8
 Jonathan Landay, “The Arms Race Under the Sea,” The Christian Science
Monitor, September 27, 1995, pp. 1, 10-11, discusses the latest develop-
ments in this area.
9
 Seymour Goodman, Peter Wolcott, and Grey Burkhart, “Building on Ba-
sics:  An Examination of High-Performance Computing Export Control
Policy in the 1990s” (Stanford:  Center for International Security and Arms
Control, 1995), p. 14, notes, on this point:  “This consideration is beyond
the scope of this study.”  The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation
Policy sponsored the study.
10
 As Bill Archey, president of the American Electronics Association has
put the matter, “it may be difficult to restrict the export of a high perfor-
mance computer, [but] it is virtually impossible to restrict the export of high
performance computing.”  Cited in Gary H. Anthes, “Restrictions Lifted on
Export of High Performance Computers,” Computerworld, October 16, 1995,
p. 32.  William Reinsch, Commerce Undersecretary for Export Adminis-
tration, has argued along the same lines, about the problematic nature of
control efforts:  “This is not a happy reality, but it is the technological
reality.”  From Pat Cooper and Theresa Hitchens, “New U.S. Computer
Export Rules Spark Optimism, Arms Control Fear,” Defense News, Octo-
ber 22, 1995, p. 26.
11
 Brian Deagon, “Why Tech Export Curbs may be a Futile Exercise,”
Investor’s Business Daily, October 23, 1995, p. A8, notes succinctly, citing
a 1990 Los Alamos National Laboratory study, that “the U.S. nuclear arse-
nal in the 1960s was designed using computing power equal to today’s hand
calculator.”
12
 Cited in Jonathan S. Landay, “Easier High-Tech Controls Reopen Prolif-
eration Debate,” Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 1995.
13
 For  details on the HPC requirements for these and many other military
systems, see Goodman et al., pp. 44-58.  Other key military applications
include cryptography and ballistic missile defensive systems.
14
 Ibid., p. 27 projects the likely progress of HPC through the turn of the
century.
15
 See Brodie, p. 39.
16 For details on Russia, China and India, See Goodman et al., pp. 17-21.
17
 See Deagon, p. A8.
18
 “Computers Worth Protecting,” The New York Times, editorial, October 7,
1995, p. 18.
19
 For a thorough presentation of both sides’ positions in this debate, see
Barbara Opall, “China Sinks U.S. in Simulated War,” Defense News, Febru-
ary 5, 1995, pp. 1, 26.
